

No. 22-1112

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

AVAIL VAPOR, LLC; BLACKSHIP TECHNOLOGIES
DEVELOPMENT, LLC; BLACKBRIAR
REGULATORY SERVICES, LLC,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

**On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit**

**BRIEF OF WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION AS
AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS**

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether FDA's denial of a premarket tobacco product application because the applicant followed FDA's own directives and evidentiary standards violated due process or was arbitrary and capricious.

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE*

Washington Legal Foundation is a nonprofit, public-interest law firm and policy center with supporters nationwide. WLF promotes free enterprise, individual rights, limited government, and the rule of law. Consistent with its free-market mission, WLF believes that the best way to limit smoking's adverse health effects is to provide smokers with a variety of less-harmful alternatives to combustible tobacco. So it has often filed briefs and regulatory comments about the Food and Drug Administration's regulation of modified-risk tobacco products. *See, e.g.*, WLF Comment, *In re Modified Risk Tobacco Product Application for iQOS System* (FDA-2017-D-3001); *In re Cigar Ass'n of Am.*, 812 F. App'x 128 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

If this Court allows the Fourth Circuit's decision to stand, millions of Americans will lack access to popular combustible tobacco alternatives. This will lead to more preventable diseases and deaths. As agencies cannot bar such lawful products from interstate commerce without providing due process and following the Administrative Procedure Act, this Court should grant the petition.

INTRODUCTION

The Court has long recognized the importance of fair notice under the Due Process Clause. Fundamental fairness requires that citizens "be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."

* No person or entity, other than Washington Legal Foundation and its counsel, paid for the brief's preparation or submission. This brief is filed more than ten days before it is due.

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). In other words, the fair notice requirement is “the first essential of due process of law.” *Connally v. Gen. Const. Co.*, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing *Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky*, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)).

Recently, the Court has most often expounded on the right to fair notice when considering vague statutes. The Court has struck down statutes and regulations because parties cannot tell whether they violate a statute or regulation by reading its text. *See, e.g., Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 595-605 (2015). Vagueness, however, is not the only basis for finding that an agency action violates due process. Agencies can also violate due process by not giving adequate notice to regulated parties.

Agencies sometimes fail to give adequate notice by not complying with the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking process. But they can also violate regulated parties’ due-process rights by issuing a “new interpretation” “that creates unfair surprise to regulated parties.” *Kisor v. Wilkie*, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019) (cleaned up).

That is what happened here. For years, FDA told electronic nicotine delivery system (ENDS) manufacturers that they need provide only certain data to obtain approval for their products. But then when faced with a court-imposed deadline to act on applications, FDA denied almost every one for following its prior guidance. Rather than take FDA at its word, companies were told they should have anticipated that FDA would change its mind and

decide that companies must present evidence that FDA said was unnecessary.

This moving the goalposts is the antithesis of due process of law. When applications were due, regulated parties lacked notice of the information FDA later decided it required to obtain approval. This led to spending eight figures for research studies to include with applications. That money went down the drain when FDA did an about face and rejected those studies as inadequate.

The APA protects parties' due-process rights by requiring courts to set aside agency actions like FDA's actions here. Allowing FDA to issue form denials to almost every company that complied with its prior guidance would invite other agencies to follow suit. The APA also cabins agencies' discretion by requiring courts to set aside arbitrary or capricious actions. FDA's action here is a quintessential example of an arbitrary decision. Rather than rely on relevant science, FDA relied on unrelated findings to deny Avail's applications. Because the Fourth Circuit split from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in affirming that decision, this Court should grant review and resolve this important issue.

STATEMENT

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 grants FDA authority to regulate cigarettes and other tobacco products. Among the TCA's goals is to provide FDA with "new and flexible enforcement authority to ensure that there is effective oversight of the tobacco industry's efforts to develop, introduce, and promote less harmful tobacco

products.” 21 U.S.C. § 387 note § 4. To accomplish this goal, Congress gave FDA authority to address tobacco products’ harms.

The TCA requires FDA to determine whether a product introduced to the market after 2007 would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). If the answer is no, then the product may not be marketed. To ensure compliance with this provision, manufacturers must submit a premarket approval application before marketing a new tobacco product. *See id.* § 387j(a), (b).

For seven years, the TCA did not cover ENDS products. But then FDA decided to exercise its statutory authority by deeming ENDS a tobacco product under the TCA. *See* 21 C.F.R. § 1100.2. This meant that at least 25,000 ENDS products on the market at the time would become illegal overnight. *See Vapor Tech. Ass’n v. FDA*, 977 F.3d 496, 498 (6th Cir. 2020). It also would require ENDS manufacturers to seek premarket approval without direction about what evidence was needed to obtain premarket approval.

So at the same time FDA deemed ENDS products covered by the TCA, it promised not to start enforcement actions against ENDS manufacturers until it developed rules for the premarket applications—by 2018. *Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products*, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 28,977-78 (May 10, 2016). FDA first

extended its amnesty to 2022, but then changed the deadline to 2021 for ENDS products with flavors other than tobacco, menthol, or mint.

In 2019, FDA reassured ENDS manufacturers seeking premarket approval that it “underst[ood] that limited data may exist from scientific studies and analyses.” FDA, *Premarket Tobacco Product Applications for Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems: Guidance for Industry*, 12 (June 2019). Thus, manufacturers would not need “to conduct long-term studies to support an application.” *Id.* at 13. Later that year, FDA repeated that it did not think studies lasting six months or more were necessary for ENDS manufacturers seeking premarket approval. *Premarket Tobacco Product Applications and Recordkeeping Requirements*, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,566, 50,619 (Sept. 25, 2019).

Activists eventually sued FDA for extending the application deadlines. Because it expected only 6,800 applications, FDA consented to a ten-month deadline for receiving applications and a one-year period for FDA to review the applications. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland ordered FDA to comply with those deadlines. *See Vapor Tech.*, 977 F.3d at 499-500. Because of COVID-19, the court later extended the application deadline by four months. *See id.*

FDA told ENDS manufacturers that their applications could include data “from a variety of sources” and that conducting new nonclinical or clinical studies was unnecessary. CA4 J.A. 34. Many ENDS manufacturers followed that guidance. They were then surprised to receive FDA’s marketing

denial orders faulting them for not conducting a randomized controlled trial or longitudinal cohort study to contrast flavored ENDS products with an appropriate comparator tobacco-flavored ENDS.

In September 2020, Avail filed its applications for its ENDS products. Following FDA guidance, the applications included results from a focus group study and a cross-sectional perception and intent study. They also included a marketing plan that had what FDA told Avail were adequate measures to prevent youth vaping. One year later, FDA denied Avail's applications because the applications lacked a randomized controlled trial or longitudinal cohort study showing that non-tobacco flavored vaping products were more successful at helping smokers quit than tobacco-flavored vaping products.

Avail petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of FDA's denial orders. The Fourth Circuit misconstrued Avail's arguments, misunderstood FDA's statutory authority, and sidestepped the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. It therefore denied the petition for review. Avail now asks this Court to review the circuit split on this important issue.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process of law. At the heart of this due-process guarantee is the right to know what conduct is prohibited. The Court has long applied this principle in many contexts and continues to do so today.

FDA denied Avail and other ENDS manufacturers fair notice of what was required for

them to continue marketing and selling their products. In fact, FDA pulled a bait-and-switch. It told manufacturers what information must be included in applications. Then, after the deadline for submitting applications passed, FDA did an about face and told manufacturers that its instructions were wrong. It then denied Avail's applications because of these alleged shortcomings. This exemplifies a due-process violation.

II. FDA's denial orders will be used for decades in administrative law books as the epitome of arbitrary and capricious. FDA ignored all the evidence Avail presented because it didn't like the result of those studies, then faulted Avail for failing to provide evidence that FDA said was unnecessary. This arbitrary and capricious process doesn't even consider FDA's about face caused by congressional pressure. So even if the denials did not deprive Avail of due process, they must be set aside under the APA.

III. The stakes here may seem low, but a closer look reveals what is at stake if this Court denies review. Every year, pharmaceutical companies spend billions of dollars relying on FDA guidance when developing drugs, vaccines, and medical devices. If that guidance is worthless, companies' research and development budgets will shrink. And the Fourth Circuit's decision here makes FDA guidance not worth the paper it's printed on. Only this Court's review can reassure companies that, if they follow FDA directions, the agency cannot arbitrarily do an about face.

ARGUMENT**I. FDA’S DENIAL ORDERS DEPRIVED AVAIL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY NOT GIVING FAIR NOTICE OF THE APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.**

Fair notice of what the law requires is at the core of the Due Process Clause. *City of Chicago v. Morales*, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (citing *Lanzetta*, 306 U.S. at 453). The Court has long recognized the importance of fair notice to due process. Almost 100 years ago, the Court described the fair notice requirement as “the first essential of due process of law.” *Gen. Const. Co.*, 269 U.S. at 391 (citing *Int’l Harvester Co. of Am.*, 234 U.S. at 221).

The fair-notice requirement is not limited to statutes or formal regulations. Agencies may not “depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.” *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see *Menkes v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 486 F.3d 1307, 1310, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2007). That is because due-process principles require agencies to “provide regulated parties fair warning” of what the agency “prohibits or requires” before taking adverse action. *Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012) (quotation omitted).

Fair notice bars agencies from announcing positions, then springing an “unfair surprise” by penalizing regulated parties for their “good-faith reliance” on the agency’s representations. *Christopher*, 567 U.S. at 156-57 (quotation omitted). This principle applies to both formal and informal

guidance. See *Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); *PHH Corp. v. CFPB*, 839 F.3d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2016), *reinstated in relevant part*, 881 F.3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).

FDA's denial orders flaunt this well-settled rule. They fault Avail for not conducting a "randomized controlled trial[,] longitudinal cohort study," or similarly "reliabl[e] and robust[]" study "over time" comparing the effectiveness of "flavored" vs. "tobacco-flavored" products in promoting smoking cessation. Pet. App. 40a. And FDA now deems "cross-sectional surveys," "[c]onsumer perception studies," and the "general scientific literature" as unreliable on this score. Pet. App. 82a.

But any shortcomings resulted from FDA's own instructions to applicants. It continually reassured manufacturers that it "did not expect that applicants would need to conduct" longitudinal studies. Pet. App. 83a n.xxiii. FDA also disavowed requiring longitudinal studies, including "randomized controlled clinical trials." *E.g.*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,619.

These statements alone are bad enough. Yet they only scratch the surface of FDA's bait-and-switch approach here. Its prior instructions explicitly encouraged submission of the very evidence it later rejected. It "support[ed] the use of different types of studies, methods, instruments and analyses" from various sources. See Letter from Mary Kushman, Lead Toxicologist, FDA to Bidi Vapor LLC, USA (May 8, 2020). As to cessation, FDA offered "[e]xamples of information that FDA recommends" as evidence of "likelihood of * * * cessation." FDA, *Premarket Tobacco Product Applications for Electronic Nicotine*

Delivery Systems (“2016 guidance”), 36 (May 2016). This included studies FDA now considers unreliable—“[p]ublished literature” and “observational studies (perception, actual use, or both) examining cessation behaviors.” *Id.* at 37.

As to flavored products, FDA asked manufacturers to “describe consumer perceptions among current ENDS users and other tobacco users for appeal.” 2016 guidance, *supra* at 40. It even told manufacturers to supply “published reports and data on consumer perceptions,” including “data [they] collect[ed] on consumer perceptions” to gauge “intentions to use the product.” *Id.* at 36.

FDA’s flip-flop creates obvious unfair surprises. FDA issued guidance to “assist persons submitting [applications] for [ENDS]” products, “to improve the efficiency of application submission and review.” FDA, *Premarket Tobacco Product Applications for Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems*, cover (Mar. 2023). FDA expressly sought to “enable ENDS manufacturers to consider and strengthen their applications based on the final PMTA for ENDS guidance.” Decl. of Mitchell Zeller, Dir., Ctr. For Tobacco Prods., FDA, ¶ 13, *Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. FDA*, 399 F. Supp. 3d 479 (D. Md. 2019) (No. 18-cv-883).

Avail spent significant sums of money submitting studies that followed FDA’s guidance. FDA cannot then penalize Avail—by denying its applications—for faithfully adhering to FDA’s instructions. FDA’s technical review acknowledges that FDA moved the evidentiary goalposts, based on what FDA “learned” from “review[ing applications]

for flavored ENDS so far.” CA4 J.A. 27 n.vi. But if FDA wanted to change its evidentiary requirements based on its “deepened * * * understanding of the [appropriate for the protection of public health] evaluation,” *id.* at 35, FDA should have acknowledged that shift before the application deadline and offered a “detailed justification.” *Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro*, 579 U.S. 211, 221 (2016) (quoting *Fox Television*, 556 U.S. at 515).

The APA forbids FDA from imposing new requirements on regulated parties after it is too late for them to comply. And as the Fifth Circuit found, the new requirements were “a substantive rule.” *R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. v. FDA*, 65 F.4th 182, 193 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The new requirements thus violated Avail’s due-process rights.

II. FDA’S DENIAL ORDERS WERE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

The Court requires agencies “articulate a satisfactory explanation for [their] action[s].” *Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2383 (2020) (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). FDA claims it weighed the risks of youth usage against the benefits of flavored ENDS products’ reducing or eliminating adult smoking. But it did not actually weigh the costs and benefits because it disregarded key evidence.

FDA’s conclusions about the risks of youth usage undergird its whole approach. FDA continues to view youth usage as a substantial threat, citing

general studies about youths' using closed-system products—small, highly portable, and often disposable devices. It also purports to rely on scientific literature and consumer studies showing that flavors appeal to youth more than tobacco-flavored or unflavored products. *See* Pet. App. 65a-68a.

WLF opposes youths' using ENDS products. The record shows that Avail similarly condemns youths' using ENDS. *See, e.g.*, CA4 J.A. 313. But FDA refused to consider evidence that its general risk assessment does not apply to Avail's products. Avail sells bottled e-liquid products used in things like tanks. *See* Pet. 11 (citation omitted). As former FDA commissioner Dr. Scott Gottlieb said, "kids just don't like those big open-tank contraptions." Nicholas Florko, *Former FDA Commissioner Calls for a Full Ban on Pod-Based E-Cigarettes*, Stat (Nov. 12, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/mdrjpyhw>.

FDA "did not assess" the "aspects of the application[s]" that showed that youth are unlikely to use Avail's products. Pet. App. 86a. Rather, it concluded that "across * * * different device types, the role of flavor is consistent." Pet. App. 69a. This was another change in course. In 2020, FDA found that youths "overwhelmingly prefer" cartridge-based ENDS because of their concealability, high nicotine content, and ease of use. CA4 J.A. 104-06. These characteristics are noticeably missing from Avail's products. Yet FDA painted with a broad brush to conclude that flavor drove youth ENDS usage. Although that may be true within a given ENDS product type, FDA could not cite any evidence about the effect of flavor across all product types. The

evidence shows that those who use Avail's products are typically in their 40s. Although this may sound youthful to some on this Court, it is not the vulnerable youth that FDA worried about.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's most recent data confirms that FDA missed the mark on youth ENDS use. It shows that youth use of tank-based ENDS compatible with Avail's bottled e-liquids had decreased in recent years, *despite* the removal of flavored cartridge-based products from the market. Compare Teresa W. Wang et al., *E-cigarette Use Among Middle and High School Students – United States, 2020*, 69 *Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report* 1310, 1310-12 (2020) (youths' use of ENDS dropped from 27.5% to 19.6%, of which only 14.8% used a tank system) with Eunice Park-Lee et al., *Notes from the Field: E-Cigarette Use Among Middle and High School Students – National Youth Tobacco Survey, United States, 2021*, 70 *Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report* 1387, 1387-88 (2021) (youths' current use of ENDS dropped from 19.6% to 11.3%, of which only 7.5% reported using a tank system).

This data shows that the percentage of youths who used a tank system after flavor-based cartridge ENDS were taken off shelves in 2020 decreased—not increased—by almost 50%. This would make no sense if FDA's assumption that flavor drives everything for youths was correct. Under FDA's reasoning, youths would have substituted tank-based systems for the cartridge systems once the cartridges were taken off the market. Because the exact opposite occurred, it further exposes FDA's conclusion that flavors drive youth initiation across ENDS device types as lacking

a rational basis in the data and FDA's overall decision as arbitrary and capricious.

FDA also ignored evidence showing Avail's successful efforts to prevent youth access. Avail's applications detailed its thorough auditing and age-verification measures and marketing strategy that targeted only adults. *See, e.g.*, CA4 J.A. 293. But FDA acknowledged "not evaluat[ing] any" of this evidence. Pet. App. 79a n.xix. Instead, citing other applications, FDA claimed to be "[un]aware of access restrictions that, to date, have been successful in sufficiently decreasing the ability of youth to obtain and use ENDS." *Id.* Yet FDA previously confirmed that age-verification protections like Avail's "would protect kids" by "preventing access to flavored" products. FDA, *Statement from Comm'r Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on proposed new Steps to protect youth by preventing access to flavored tobacco products and banning menthol in cigarettes* (Nov. 15, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/3na4ec87>. Ignoring this contrary evidence was arbitrary and capricious. *See Roe v. Dep't of Def.*, 947 F.3d 207, 225 (4th Cir. 2020); *Clark County v. FAA*, 522 F.3d 437, 442-43 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

FDA then concluded that, to overcome the perceived high risk of youth usage, Avail must produce particularly rigorous evidence of countervailing benefits to adult smokers. Pet. App. 39a-40a. Thus, if FDA miscalculated the risks of youth usage, it also mis-calibrated the evidentiary standard for judging benefits to adult smokers.

Even so, FDA's sky-high evidentiary mandate for showing smoker benefits is arbitrary. FDA demands product-specific studies contrasting the

appeal of flavored vs. tobacco-flavored products. Yet, as discussed above, FDA saw no need for such specifics in asserting risks to youth. In fact, it found that it need not consider more specific studies. The reason was simple: the product-specific studies for youth usage did not support FDA's position but the broad studies did.

Similarly, to show that adult smokers reduce or stop smoking, FDA deemed all "cross-sectional survey[s]," "[c]onsumer perception studies," and "general scientific literature" surveys inherently unreliable. Pet. App. 82a-83a. Yet FDA called these very same studies "the best available evidence" of youth usage. Pet. App. 81a n.xxii. FDA thinks that product-specific features drive adult cessation but not youth initiation. Pet. App. 80a n.xx. This "self-contradictory, wandering logic does not constitute an adequate explanation." *Del. Dep't of Nat. Res. & Env't Control v. EPA*, 785 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).

FDA also failed to "adequately consider the impact of" its extraordinarily specific evidentiary standard. See *Ackerman v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.*, 995 F.3d 528, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2021). FDA ignored the consequences of employing a rationale that apparently rejects all flavored ENDS products for insufficient evidence using cookie-cutter reasoning. Those denials are forcing an exodus of products from the market—products that FDA acknowledges former smokers rely on to stop smoking. See FDA, *FDA Issues Decisions on Additional E-Cigarette Products* (Mar. 24, 2022), <https://tinyurl.com/32pzddkj>. FDA previously cautioned that this "public health outcome" was to be "avoided if at all possible" because

of the “serious” risk that former adult smokers would switch back to cigarettes. Zeller Decl., *supra* ¶¶ 12, 15. FDA likewise failed to consider that its denials could cause ENDS users to turn to the illicit market—another problem FDA previously recognized. *See* 81 Fed. Reg. at 29,007. Now, FDA says nothing about what will happen to millions of former smokers. This was arbitrary and capricious.

III. REGULATED PARTIES WILL BE UNABLE TO RELY ON ANY AGENCY GUIDANCE UNLESS THIS COURT INTERVENES.

This case is of critical importance to the ENDS-manufacturing industry. At the start of the process, FDA expected to receive about 6,800 ENDS applications. Although that may seem like a large number, it is small in the scheme of our nation’s economy. As usual, however, FDA missed the mark by light years. It received about 6.5 million ENDS applications, or over 900 times its projection. The astronomically high number of applications show just how entrenched ENDS products are in our nation’s marketplace. This alone illustrates the reach of the Fourth Circuit’s decision to abdicate its responsibility and rubber-stamp FDA’s form denial letters to millions of ENDS applicants.

But the effects of the Fourth Circuit’s decision will be felt far beyond the ENDS market. FDA, of course, must also approve prescription drugs for marketing in the United States. The process for obtaining that approval is long and arduous. Companies must go through multiple stages of clinical trials to show that the drug is safe and

effective for human use. These studies normally take years but can last over a decade in some cases.

Drug manufacturers rely on FDA guidance when deciding how to structure their clinical trials so that drugs can be approved if the clinical trials are successful. Yet now drug companies undertaking costly research and development must assume the risk that FDA will do an about face when ruling on their drug applications. Imagine a company that, over a decade, has spent hundreds of millions of dollars following FDA guidance while conducting clinical trials. Then after the company submits its drug application, FDA changes its mind and wants a different type or clinical trial—one that will take years and millions of dollars to complete.

Under the Fourth Circuit's decision, the APA blesses such flip-flopping. That is, FDA is not bound by its guidance and need not tell companies when it changes its mind or give them fair notice of the regulatory requirements. It can flip-flop based on its leadership facing tough questions at one congressional hearing.

Nor are drugs and tobacco products the total of FDA's regulatory authority. Like drugs, vaccines (normally) go through years or decades of research and testing that cost millions of dollars. Under the Fourth Circuit's decision, FDA could decide that all that testing was for nothing if a politician pressures FDA to change the requirements for clinical trials.

Medical devices must also undergo rigorous testing before sales begin. But fewer companies will invest in creating new devices if FDA could change

the rules mid game. In short, any party following FDA regulations will have to factor in the chance of FDA changing its requirements when deciding whether to invest in promising research.

The Fourth Circuit's APA rule, of course, does not apply only to FDA. It is a general rule about agencies using their "expertise" to change their minds and not give regulated parties fair notice. Nothing stops the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration from changing its guidance about automobile testing after production has started. This would mean that cars slated to hit the road soon could be blocked because of a NHTSA about face. Again, that would mean millions of dollars and years of innovation wasted because of an unelected bureaucrat's decision to alter requirements after the fact.

The same logic applies to any other product that needs federal regulatory approval. Be it something used on the ground, like herbicides regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency, or something that flies overhead, like airplanes regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration, development will slow if regulated companies must guess at whether the regulatory agencies will change their minds down the road.

The only way to stop this regulatory uncertainty is to grant review. That way, this Court can reverse the Fourth Circuit's decision and reaffirm that agencies must provide fair notice of what is required of regulated parties. Unannounced and poorly reasoned switcheroos should not survive judicial scrutiny.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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